The following essay will show that dealing with the Hungarian refugees unmasks the popular stereotypes of the response to the uprising of 1956 as a myth of Austrian national scholarship. There was neither the unrestricted willingness of Austrians nor the boundless gratitude of the Hungarian refugees. The initial sympathies were soon followed by disillusionment and disappointment. Austrians as well as Hungarians were confronted with a reality in which the Austrian cliché of the Hungarian freedom fighter was no more appropriate than the ideas of the Hungarians about the Golden West.
Helmer had to cocede that Austria was not able to provide heated accommodations in light of the flood of refugees. Even a train heated by a steam locomotive had to be used as emergency quarters. Later, barracks of the army were openend to offer heated rooms to refugee families with children. In Graz, Judenburg and Traiskirchen, the federal government set up three additional refugee camps. At the end of November, Austria reached the limit of its reception capacity and appealed for help to the Western countries:
"Our country has done what is humanly possible. It is now up to the Western countries and aid organizations to intervene quickly, since otherwise our own people will be exposed to the most serious economic and health hazards by the extensive granting of the right of asylum to the unfortunate Hungarian refugees." (Rauchensteiner, 1956: 87) There were refugee camps in a total of 86 communities in Burgenland, and outside of Burgenland another 61 communities hosted refugees by the end of November. Helmer had to admit that in view of the stream of refugees, Austria was not in a position to give all the refugees heated quarters.
In the course of November and December Austria was caring for 165,000 refugees. Only in early 1957, when Soviet troops secured the border using mines and the Hungarian government issued decrees placing the assisting of flight from the country under criminal penalty, did the situation calm. In the following months, the stream of refugees ebbed substantially. Between October 1956 and June 1957, a total of 178,000
Hungarian refugees were in Austrian care. When the revolution began, the Federal Government had expected a maximum of 10,000 refugees only.
The Situation of the Hungarian Refugees in Austria
The camps which were made available to the refugees were in terrible condition. The reception camp in Eisenstadt had been used by Soviet soldiers until 1956 and had not yet been reconditioned. Awaiting the refugees were leaky roofs and windows, insufficiently heated rooms and desolate sanitary equipment. Completely insufficient furnishings forced many to spend the nights on primitive straw bedding on the floor. In Traiskirchen too, the former Cadet School was altered in a makeshift way into an improvised reception camp.
Life in the overfilled camps wore the people down.
Disappointment combined with helplessness, boredom, lack of orientation and fear for the future. The dissatisfaction regarding the conditions rose, as did the tensions between refugees and natives. In Salzburg, 100 refugees even started a hunger strike over the poor conditions of care and maintenance there. The Federal Government entrusted psychiatrists Hans Hoff and Hans Strotzka with scientific research into the psychohygienical care of Hungarian refugees. Both experts came to the conclusion that refugees were only accepted by the native population with sympathy and willingness to help when they "behaved like poor, helpless children…When that is not the case, an almost regular pattern of aggression arises" (Hoff and Strotzka, 1958: 31) . The Government tried to confront the collapse of the camps with concrete programs. The refugees were given radios, Hungarian-language newspapers and magazines were offered to them. Cultural and sporting events, such as films, dance classes and soccer tournaments were organized as well. In addition, every refugee was supposed to consume at least 2400 calories per day. However, the normalization of conditions in the camps and the rise in the standard of living there increased the aggression level of the native Austrian population, as described by Hoff and Strotzka.
The daily newspaper, Die Presse, summarized the public mood as follows: "Those who are not in rags and reduced to skin and bone cannot really be in need." 
Emigration from Austria
In the last section of the paper, the question will be considered as to why only 18,000
Hungarians, only a small percentage of the refugees, remained in Austria. The large majority of the refugees found a new homeland in other European countries or overseas.
What motives caused the refugees back then to use Austria as a temporary haven and to move on?
The lack of prospects for a future in Austria takes first place in this respect. The Austrian government held the view that Austria's economy could only integrate 30,000 refugees without burdening the labor market. The remaining 150,000 were recommended to quickly migrate. The Provincial authorities were instructed to register those willing to emigrate and to process their exit applications and forward them to international refugee organizations. The largest of these organizations were the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), the Lutheran World Federation (WCC) and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). By the end of January 1957, 70% of the refugees had already left Austria. In December 1956, the United States raised its entrance quota to 21,000 persons. According to the calculations of Friedrich Kern, European countries took in a total of 77,525 refugees, while the number going overseas was 82,330. (Murben, 2006: 358) .
Conclusion
In conclusion, we will again look into the myth of the Austrian large-scale willingness to In reality, not only had Austria misjudged the extent of the Hungarian refugee wave, but the whole of the West was surprised by it, and inadequately prepared. As in Austria, the infrastructures for the reception of Hungarian refugees had first to be created in other countries as well. Despite all legitimate criticism of Austria, the fact remains that Austria, under the most difficult of conditions, kept its borders open for the Hungarian refugees. It gave the refugees help in their flight, provided asylum to all refugees and, in
